Extensive literature in hospitality finance indicates that the lodging depression of the 1980s spanned the years 1980-92 and that the entire industry was losing money for most of that period. For example, Hanson (1994) claims that "after operating at a loss in every year since 1982, the U.S. lodging industry will again be profitable in 1993." However, there are many reasons to believe that exchange-listed lodging firms may have had a different picture than the industry as a whole. This paper discusses some of those reasons and focuses on the profitability of lodgng firms listed on the major stock exchanges. The results presented show that the exchange-listed lodging firms were generally profitable during the depression years and that the percentage of lodging firms reporting losses during this period was not very different from the overall percentage of all listed firms reporting losses.
Introduction and Purpose
Extensive evidence indicates that the lodging depression of the 1980s spanned the years 1980-92. For example, Hanson (1994) claims that "after operating at a loss in every year since 1982, the U.S. lodging industry will again be profitable in 1993." Rushmore (1996) claims that the depression started in 1980 and there was a decrease in absolute demand between 1980-83. The demand for rooms picked up after 1983 but overbuilding due to tax laws caused overall losses for the lodging industry. As per Hanson (1994) the lodging industry started losing money in 1982, at the rate of approximately $1,000 per room per year. The losses peaked in 1990 when an average room lost a little more than $5,000.1993 was the first profitable year for the lodging industry when an average room generated approximately $1,000 of profits.
If, on average, each room was losing money then it is reasonable to conclude that the lodgng industry as a whole was also losing money. Again extensive research (Hanson, 1994; Beals & Engel, 1995) indicates that the industry was indeed losing money. This is a very grim picture of the industry. It is difficult to imagne that in one of the most efficient markets in the world, an entire industry could lose so much money over such a long period.
I
Were there some winners in tlus picture of losses? For example, the losses incurred a per room are an average number for the industry and it is reasonable to assume that there i were some properties generating profits. Even if we assume that all properties were losing money, some sector of the lodgng industry had to make money because new is possibly a tax effect due to the elimination of some tax shelters in that year (Chon, 1993) . The median return on equity was never below zero and started declining from 1984 and was very close to pre-84 level by 1991. After stabilizing at approximately 10% it started climbing in 1993 and was 12.4% in 1995, the latest year for w h c h figures are available.
Results and Implications
This paper describes an industry that is in some trouble but not in complete panic, a picture that is painted by previous research. However, there are some key issues that have emerged from these descriptive results. The first question is the degree to which the lodging firms benefit from franchse and management fees to tide over the recession : phase of the lodgng cycle. For example, Hyatt does not own any property and receives I all of its revenues from franchising and management fees. Therefore, a recession will not affect Hyatt as much as another operator with many corporate owned properties. However, during the time the economy is expanding, Hyatt will not fully participate in the expansion. In other words, the total revenue line plotted over time will be relatively flat as compared to lodgng firms that own properties. T h s fact is crucial to mak ring investment decisions for both individuals and vrofessional investors. To the extent that I 1 a firm relies on franchsing and management fees, its revenue stream is more stable i and less susceptible to a downturn in the economy. A part of the finding may also challenge the notion that firms with h g h operating leverage take a proportionally greater hit during depression. The proportion of F&M revenue over total revenue may act as a moderating variable to partly mitigate the effect of a depression on firms with high operating leverage.
The second issue that emerges is the economies of scale argument for both reven and costs. For example, one implication is that independently owned properties would have higher operating expenses than franchised properties. Additionally franchised properties would get a larger share of increased business in a particular regon due to the 
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Median Return on Assets --Median Return on Equity marketing and reservation clout of the chain. These issues are empirically testable and deserve more attention by academic researchers.
